Using design thinking to improve strategic decisions during collaborative sensemaking by Ekaterina Kotina (3204975) et al.
   
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial 4.0 International License. 
 
Using Design Thinking to improve Strategic 
Decisions during Collaborative Sensemaking 
KOTINA Ekaterina*; KORIA Mikko and PRENDEVILLE Sharon  
Loughborough University London, UK 
* Corresponding author e-mail: E.Kotina@lboro.ac.uk 
doi: 74 
Human cognitive limitations affect strategic decision-making. One of such 
effects is emergence of cognitive biases, deviations from rationality in 
judgment. These biases can negatively influence an organisation's capability 
to capture and utilize new ideas, thus inhibiting innovation. Researchers 
have documented different strategies for mitigating cognitive biases – and 
many of them overlap with the ones emphasised in design thinking. 
However, research so far does not offer any specific “recipes” for mitigation 
of cognitive biases. This paper links together research on challenges of 
strategic decision-making, cognitive biases and design thinking. The paper 
investigates the effects of applying design-thinking tool in collaborative 
sensemaking stage, within a small business team, aiming to mitigate 
confirmation bias. The study indicated that newly introduced design-
thinking tools did not have the expected positive influence on decision-
making. The research contributes to the field by developing a new 
framework on how to identify and mitigate confirmation bias in strategic 
decision-making. 
keywords: design thinking; cognitive bias; confirmation bias; strategic decision 
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Introduction 
Decision-making is a cognitive process where one selects a satisfactory solution among 
several alternative possibilities. Strategic decision-making is the process by which top-
management in companies (individuals or groups of people) make the most fundamental 
decisions (Das, 1999; Mintzberg & Waters, 1982). Individual subjective factors influence 
 environmental and organisational perceptions and subsequently, strategy formulation 
(Anderson & Paine, 1975). Strategic decision processes are characterized by novelty, 
complexity and open-endedness, and lack of structure (Mintzberg, 1976; Mason & Mitroff, 
1981).  Decision makers usually begin with little comprehension of the situation and then 
deepen their understanding while working with the challenge. These challenges are often 
“wicked problems” (Churchman, 1967), which are also studied in design research (Dorst, 
2015). To simplify these “wicked problems”, decision makers can rely on judgmental rules, 
or heuristics (Schwenk, 1984; Levy, 1994; von Krogh & Roos, 1996; Das, 1999). Sometimes 
these “rules of thumb” could be necessary and useful, but they can also lead to 
emergence of cognitive biases –  systematic patterns of deviation from norm or rationality 
in judgment (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 1982; Haselton, 2005; Kahneman, 
Lovallo, & Sibony, 2011).  
Researchers have documented different strategies for mitigating cognitive biases – many 
of these overlap with those emphasised in design thinking  (Liedtka, 2014; McCollough, 
Denmark, & Harker, 2013; Dorst, 2015). For instance, in their review, Liedtka et al. (2014) 
discuss influences of tools like ethnography, visualisation, team collaboration, prototyping 
on projection, ego-centric empathy, focusing illusion, confirmation and availability biases. 
Some potential methods for mitigation of biases include increase of accuracy motivation 
(Hart et al., 2009). These are methods of self-awareness and self-assessment that are 
referred to as the two-system models of reasoning. However, research so far does not 
offer any specific “recipes” for mitigating cognitive biases. Indeed, in design-thinking, 
research and practices addressing “wicked problems” utilise the process of abductive 
reasoning, a creative inference that involves integration and justification of ideas to 
develop new knowledge that is important at the discovery stage of scientific hypothesis 
formation and testing (Walton, 2014). Furthermore, designers use “framing” as one of the 
key problem-solving processes through which they can conceive new approaches to 
problem situations (Dorst, 2015; Whitbeck, 1998). Investigation into how design-thinking 
methods could help manage biases has the potential to contribute to this field of study. 
In this paper, we link together the challenges of strategic decision-making and cognitive 
biases with design-thinking research, beginning to build a basis for managers to effectively 
utilise design thinking to improve organizational decision-making. This could help 
managers to cognitively legitimise (Birkinshaw, 2008; Suchman, 1995) and support 
integration of the design thinking mindset and its approaches and tools within 
organisations (Schmiedgen et al., 2015). This can improve, for instance, organisational 
working culture (e.g., working in teams), and clarify design thinking’s utility as a method 
for improving organisational decision-making processes and outcomes. Specifically, the 
paper investigates the effect of design-thinking tool on confirmation bias in the 
sensemaking stage within small business team. 
The research question asks: 
Can confirmation bias be identified, categorized and mitigated with 
the help of design thinking in the collaborative sensemaking stage of 
strategic decision-making? 
To answer the question, we will first introduce the key concepts connected to the chosen 
topic and review the literature on bias mitigation in business and design. Then we will 
show through a pilot study in a small business team how confirmation bias was identified 
and targeted.   
This research indicated that there is a potential for emergence of confirmation bias in 
strategic decision-making. Moreover, it was observed that newly introduced design-
thinking tools did not have the expected positive influence on strategic decision-making, 
though the use of the tools was seen to be beneficial. The intervention was only short-
term, and to achieve the long-lasting effect, one needs to work more with the mindset to 
change approaches for tackling strategic issues.  Thus, there is a potential that if these 
tools are to be applied for a longer period of time, there likely could be a positive change 
in decision-making process.  The research contribution is the new framework on how to 
identify and mitigate confirmation bias in strategic decision-making. It can be used further 
by researchers, as well as by managers in preparation of decision-making sessions. 
Strategic decision-making and collaborative sensemaking 
Strategic decisions reflect the inner corporate context (psychological, structural, cultural 
and political factors) and the outer context (for instance, competitive factors) (Pettigrew, 
1992) and interaction with external environment (Ginsberg, 1988). They differ from 
routine decisions because they are mostly unstructured, as decision maker should utilise 
judgement, evaluation and insights when dealing with the challenge (Stahl & Grigsby, 
1992). Strategic decisions usually involve a large proportion of corporate resources, as 
well as risk and trade-offs, they are difficult to assess in terms of performance; they are 
political, and rarely have one best solution (Wilson, 2003). It is essential that decision 
makers choose an optimal strategy when they face risk and uncertainty. Such frequently 
used management science techniques as linear programming, integer programming, 
network models, and simulation are used to improve decision-making. However,  decision-
makers have both limited capabilities for assessing consequences and a limited period of 
time for making decisions (Jones, 1999), as well as comprehensive information is not 
available for them (Liedtka & Ogilvie, 2011). 
Strategic decision-making in organisations implies both individual sensemaking and 
collaborative sensemaking – communication of information, shared understanding, and 
interpretation of other’s interactions with information which helps to overcome individual 
limitations (de Terssac, 1996; Dervin, 2003; Paul, 2010) of decision makers. It is important 
for improving decisions through better information acquisition, different perspectives and 
options, perception, and consensus formation (Weick, 1995). 
 
Confirmation bias in strategic decision-making 
Biases are widely acknowledged in decision-making. For example, Bazerman (1994) 
discusses 13 types of cognitive biases occurring in managerial decision-making. Strategy 
scholars also identify several biases that could occur in strategic decision processes. For 
instance, Schwenk (1984, 1995) identifies 11 cognitive biases, including confirmation bias, 
single outcome calculation, illusion of control, etc. He then classifies and maps these 
biases onto the three specific decision stages (i.e. goal formulation, alternative generation 
and alternative selection). According to Barnes (1984), five biases occur among managers 
and strategic planners: availability, hindsight, misunderstanding the sampling process, 
judgments of correlation and causality, and representativeness. According to Liedtka 
(2014), during design-thinking process several biases occur that can affect decision-
 making, including confirmation, projection, egocentric empathy, focusing illusion, and 
hot/cold gap biases.  
One type of cognitive bias appears when people tend to defend their attitudes, beliefs, 
and behaviors from challenges (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Olson & Stone, 2005). Selectivity of 
this type has often been called a congeniality bias (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 1998, 
2005), positive hypothesis testing (Klayman & Ha, 1987), confirmatory (e.g. Rabin & 
Schrag, 1999) or confirmation bias (e.g., Jonas, 2001). Confirmation bias is the human 
tendencies to search for, collect, interpret, analyse and/or recall information in a way that 
confirms one’s prior beliefs or wishes (Jorgensen & Papatheocharous, 2015). 
Confirmation bias emergence is closely linked to the selective exposure to information. 
Hart et al. (2009) name the following motivational forces behind exposure decisions: 
defense motivation and accuracy motivation (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Eagly, Chen, 
Chaiken, & Shaw-Barnes, 1999; Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Prislin & Wood, 2005; Wyer & 
Albarracin, 2005; Baumeister, 2005). People tend to believe in the accuracy of their views 
(defense motivation) because it gives them psychological stability and personal validation, 
but also cross-check their views with external reality (accuracy motivation), because they 
need accurate perceptions of the world around them. Current evidence shows, however, 
that people are almost two times more likely to select information, confirming, rather that 
disconfirming, their pre-existing beliefs (Hart et al., 2009).  
Attributes of defense motivation such as commitment, value relevance, confidence, and 
challenge or support, closed-mindedness increase the selection of confirming information. 
On the contrary, information utility and open-mindedness lead to increase of accuracy 
motivation and therefore, mitigation of confirmation bias (Hart et al., 2009). 
Past research has examined whether confirmation biases emerge at different information 
processing stages, like exposure, interpretation, and memory. However, so far meta-
analysis has been conducted solely on emergence of confirmation biases at exposure and 
memory stages of information processing (Das, 1999), and there is not much information 
and research found about the emergence of confirmation bias at information 
interpretation stage (Bargh, 1999; Bruner, 1957; Darley & Gross, 1983; Duncan, 1976; 
Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), which in this paper is also referred to 
as sensemaking stage.  
In a business context, there is also not much research done on biases. Some existing 
studies explore how managers systematically ignore disconfirming information and seek 
information that confirms their initial values and views and thus are prone to confirmation 
bias (Hogarth, 1987; Schwenk, 1988). Managers have a tendency to see the sources of 
confirming information more trustworthy than sources of disconfirming information 
(Schwenk, 1984). Biases also impact investment decisions and strategies (Verma, 2016). 
Belief revisions in auditors and search for evidence have also been connected to 
confirmation bias (McMillan, 1993), and professionals have a tendency to sell winning 
stocks too quickly and hold on to losing stocks too long (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). There 
has also been research (Krieger & Fiske, 2006) on unintentional discrimination in hiring 
and promotion practices. Confirmation bias affects due diligence in business contexts 
(Benoliel, 2015), justification of the deal when top-management “falls in love” with it 
(Aiello & Watkins, 2000) and builds optimistic assumptions (Eccles et al., 1999). Kahneman 
et al. (2011) also refer to the effects of confirmation bias and the tendency to minimise 
the risks and costs of something that one likes and exaggerates its benefits. Jorgensen and 
Papatheocharous (2015) review empirical studies from the software engineering field 
connected with confirmation bias, and present a study examining how the prior belief in 
the benefits of a contract type among experienced software engineering managers affects 
the interpretation of evidence.  
Most studies have been conducted with students as the subjects of research. Few studies 
have examined professionals and managers (Hart et al., 2009).  
 
Design thinking as a method to mitigate confirmation bias   
More traditional methods that could potentially mitigate cognitive biases include some 
methods leading to increase of accuracy motivation, for instance, two-system models of 
reasoning (Kahneman, 2011; Lilienfeld, Ammirati, & Landfield, 2009; Milkman, 2009; 
Morewedge, Yoon, & Scopelliti, 2015). In these models of reasoning, individuals first make 
an intuitive judgment that can further be altered after more systematic thinking was 
utilized: through “System 1” and “System 2” processes, respectively (Evans, 2003; 
Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010; Sloman, 1996). In effective debiasing training, 
information that could be overlooked during the “System 1” evaluation, is encouraged to 
be considered (e.g., Hirt & Markman, 1995), or individuals are encouraged to utilise 
statistical reasoning and normative rules (e.g., Larrick, 1990). Also, people utilise such 
debiasing methods as timesaving recommendation systems (Goldstein, 2008) and 
commitment devices when they cannot make choices appealing now but that could be 
beneficial to them in the long run (e.g., Schwartz, 2014; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). 
However, Morewedge et al. (2015) note that it is not evident so far whether training 
effectively improves general decision-making (Arkes, 1991; Milkman, 2009; Phillips, 2004).  
There has been some recent discussion about use of design-thinking practices to mitigate 
sets of cognitive biases in different stages of decision-making process in both personal and 
structural (organisational) systems (Liedtka, 2014; McCollough, Denmark, & Harker, 2013). 
In their review, Liedtka et al. (2014) discuss that, for instance, at idea generation stage, 
such design-thinking tools as ethnography, visualisation, team collaboration lessen the 
effects of the projection, ego-centric empathy, and focusing illusion biases. Bias 
introduced by customers (say/do gap) can be mitigated with the help of research methods 
like journey mapping and tools like prototyping where one can precisely describe their 
experience and see what needs are not met. Other tools, for instance participant 
observation, could be argued to reduce the reliance on self-reports. Prototyping, explicit 
identification of detailed assumptions, market feedback collection, and reflection to 
stimulate solutions iterations mitigate the effects of testing biases. If they are combined 
with ethnographic methods, they lessen the effects of such biases as planning fallacy, 
confirmation bias, endowment effect, and availability bias, which positively influences the 
array of proposed solutions and supports desire to test different novel ones (Liedtka, 
2014). A number of studies have highlighted how individuals rely on a variety of material 
practices and artefacts, such as drawings and prototypes (Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2002; 
Sutton & Hargadon, 1996), slide presentations (Kaplan, 2011), visual maps (Doyle & Sims, 
2002), and Lego bricks (Oliver & Roos, 2007; Heracleous & Jacobs, 2008), to support the 
conversational practices through which they exchange, combine, and construct 
interpretations as they engage in collaborative sensemaking (Gioia, Thomas, Clark, & 
Chittipeddi, 1994; Gioia & Mehra, 1996) underpinning future-oriented group processes, 
such as strategy making, new product development, and planning of organisational 
 change. Such material artefacts are important “sensemaking resources” (Gephart, 1993) 
that facilitate transitions from individual to collaborative sensemaking. 
 
The study: using prototyping to mitigate confirmation bias during 
collaborative sensemaking  
 
Description of typical confirmation bias study  
A typical confirmation bias experiment looks like as follows (e.g., Frey, 1981): the 
participants are confronted with a decision case and are asked to reach a preliminary or a 
final decision. Next, participants are offered additional pieces of information that they can 
select (sequentially or simultaneously). In most experiments, these pieces look like 
comments of experts or former participants. In experiments with confirmation biases, the 
participants are sometimes asked to answer a set of questions prior to the experiment 
about their general views, their experience (Dow, 2012; Jorgensen & Papatheocharous, 
2015), demographic and self-report assessments, or write an essay about the proposed 
topic; in some cases, participants are even told that their ideas will be later discussed in a 
group (Canon, 1964; Freedman, 1965) to see how the degree of confirmation bias 
changes. After that, the intervention activity is happening, and later post-evaluation phase 
is conducted. 
In design-thinking experiments on prototyping (Dow et al., 2012), participants are 
requested to prepare from one to several prototypes (e.g. online ads) to share with their 
peers. Sometimes, participants need to rank the choices (Artiz & Walker, 2010; Kress, 
2012) to better understand their initial preferences.  
In both studies, after the experiment, the participants fill in follow-up forms and answer 
questions how their decision changed (Jorgensen & Papatheocharous, 2015), on the basis 
of what it changed, what was the group dynamics at the end of group discussion (Dow et 
al., 2012), or, in some cases, if they were told about the biases and their influence, 
whether they will support their decisions with debiasing techniques in future decision-
making situations in similar or other fields (Morewedge, Yoon, & Scopelliti, 2015). In 
design thinking (Dow et al., 2012), participants’ joint prototypes are evaluated by experts. 
In these experiment designs, confirmation bias could manifest itself as a change of 
attitude, belief or behaviour the participant experiences during the experiment, according 
to accuracy or defense motivation behaviours noted by the researcher. The degree of 
confirmation bias is matched as well with the level of experience of the participant. 
Jonas et al. (2001) argue also that degree of confirmation bias in experiments is influenced 
by how the additional information on the topic is presented and / or processed: 
sequentially or simultaneously. In business or political contexts, the decision maker seeks 
information sequentially, as he or she usually does not have all necessary information at 
hand in the beginning of the decision-making process (Vertzberger, 1990). When 
information is gathered like this, it is not possible to determine in advance how many 
pieces of confirming or disconfirming information one will request, as well, it is not 
possible to delay processing the information before the selection finishes. However, as the 
questions are asked retrospectively, systematic memory distortion may emerge, thus 
being an alternative explanation for the study findings. Also, participants when receiving 
pieces of information sequentially would more focus on their decision, but if the 
participants receive pieces of information simultaneously, focus is more on the evaluation 
and comparison of the information pieces, not on the prior decision. 
Dow et al. (2012) used open-ended questions at the icebreaker and follow-up stages to 
evaluate team dynamics. Four questions were from the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI), 
an assessment of viewpoints on negotiation (Curhan, 2006). The relationship questions 
from the SVI provided good overview of the team rapport in terms of overall impressions, 
satisfaction, trust, and foundations for future interaction. The fifth question derived from 
the Inclusion of Self in Others Scale, a measure of someone’s sense of connectedness with 
another individual (Aron, 1992). 
It is also important to note that homogeneous groups (i.e. groups consisting of individuals 
with the same initial opinions) show a stronger confirmation bias when selecting decision-
relevant information than heterogeneous groups (consisting of individuals with varying 
initial opinions) (Frey, 2009). For homogeneous groups, it was found that the larger the 
group was, the greater their perceived confidence in their decision was, and therefore, 
larger confirmation bias was observed. The larger the minority with different opinion 
within a group, the less confirmation bias is observed. Also, if in the group there is a 
representative who is to articulate group decision, the confirmation bias is larger among 
such representatives than among non-representatives. Based on the findings above, we 
can propose a conceptual framework (Fig.1) illustrating how confirmation bias manifests 
and might be mitigated at different stages of the study: 
 
 
Figure 1   Confirmation bias manifestation in strategic business decision-making 
Study design 
After the framework was developed, we applied it to the chosen case company. The 
company was a Russian small-sized biotechnology company. Seven participants (referred 
to here as C1F1-C1M5) were asked to find a solution to a company-provided strategic 
business challenge during a design-thinking workshop. Before the experiment and after it, 
interviews with the top-manager were conducted to clarify the challenge (before the 
 experiment) and assess the implications of the experiment (after it). During the 
experiment, the participants were asked the following question: how can the company 
increase the value of its products and scientific projects to be more attractive for potential 
partners?  
Drawing on the protocol for design thinking experiments on prototyping (Dow, 2012), 
each participant was requested to prepare written pre-sessional response to the question 
and prototype to share with their peers afterwards. Prototypes sketches were collected to 
check their consistency with the replies the participants gave before and during oral 
responses while sharing their ideas with others. Demographic parameters were calculated 
(average age, median age, gender, sex); educational background parameters (how many 
participants have higher education); and professional experience parameters (average 
length of stay in the company and position). This information was collected to check 
whether multidisciplinarity could be connected to the reported solutions preferences, as 
well as disposition for confirmation bias. The similarity and degree of inclusion of other 
participants’ comments was analysed.  
After the differences between the participant pre-response and transcribed oral response 
were analysed, we thematically categorized the ideas based on the thematic similarity of 
content. Each solution idea was encoded with a specific name like “participation in the 
exhibitions”, “searching for the market news”, and “uniqueness of solutions” (altogether 
47 distinct ideas were identified, discounting the repetitions). Then these ideas were 
clustered into 21 subcategories, which were then formed into seven big categories (IP, 
Partnerships, Marketing, Offering, Staff, Sales, Funding).  
It was checked how these categories and subcategories appeared in pre-responses and in 
the responses in the post-questionnaire that took place a month later after the 
experiment. In addition, for the post-questionnaire, mean value of self-originated 
opinions, mean value of other-originated opinions, and the ratio between them were 
calculated, to understand participants’ preferences towards either their own or other-
originated opinions.  
Moreover, the following classification of participants’ responses was performed: 
generalist verses specialised responses. The unit of analysis for generalist/specialised 
responses was the whole response given by the participant. The cut-off point between 
generalist and specialised responses was in the level of solution detalization. Generalist 
responses were those that included discussion by participants of different solution 
methods from multiple fields (“themes”) with the same level of detail. If the person went 
into more details in the specific field of discussion (like “marketing”) and gave more 
examples on this one specific field, then the reply was categorised as specialised. It was 
checked whether “generalists” were less prone to confirmation bias than “specialists”.   
From the follow-up questionnaire, the average rating that participants gave each idea was 
calculated, and self-originated verses other originated statements comparison was 
performed. The ratio of mean value of self-originated opinions to mean value of other-
originated opinions was calculated. The analysis performed was to check whether in the 
post-response participants rated their initial ideas higher than others’ ideas, or were 
complementary with other-originated opinions. Moreover, the mean rating of the self-
originated statements was compared to everyone's other-originated statements. The 
means of self-originated responses were compared to other-originated responses 
statistically with the use of Mann-Whitney U-test1.  
Further, to estimate how the solutions list of participants changed from initially preferred 
solutions (during the workshop) to solutions chosen a month later (in post-questionnaire), 
the subcategories named during the workshop were listed, and then compared to the list 
of subcategories rated by participants as of most importance in post-questionnaire. In 
addition, after the results from the post-questionnaire were received, average ratings of 
the categories were calculated to find out the most “popular” solutions.  
Further, to relate participants’ responses to the confirmation bias discussion, the 
participants’ responses were analysed against motivational forces that mitigate or 
strengthen confirmation bias. The selected unit of analysis for the motivation 
categorisation was the whole post-response of the participant in the workshop session. 
The response of each participant was analysed in terms of 1) 
Repeating/confirming/adding/questioning of pre-response in oral response; 2) 
Generality/Specialisation of response; 3) inclusion of others’ comments or solutions; 4) 
degree to which the participant changed his/her opinion between responses; 5) focus of 
response (one idea or several ideas); 6) qualitative check of whether there were clear 
differences across groups based on  age, sex, position, and career experience. 
 
Study results 
A total of 96 segments were identified in the responses, and categorised according to 
content. 
 
Table 1  Categories and subcategories of solutions identified 
Category Subcategory Number of 
segments 
Example of reply 
IP  focus on the uniqueness 
of our biotechnology 
methods 
4 «idea that is our product should 
match 2 main criteria – 
uniqueness and demand» 
protect our IP 5 «patent therefore should  also be  
unique and on demand» 
Total 9  
Partnerships partner with external 
professionals and 
scientists 
6 «attraction of scientific experts 
for evaluation» 
partner with external 
laboratories to create 
new IP 
4 «for sales, it is important to 
increase its real (scientific) value 
- attracting outsourced 
laboratories for the expertise of 
the IP» 
form good partnerships 5 «also, there is the way to 
                                                                
1Mann-Whitney U-test estimates that it is equally likely that a randomly selected value from one 
sample will be less than or greater than a randomly selected value from a second sample. 
 increase the value of IP is to use 
it in a real project by ourselves 
and then sell it to partners» 
build good connections 2 «it is connections, scientific 
potential» 
Total 17  
Marketing 
 
participate in 
conferences 
3 «participation in conferences, 
invited lecturers, advertising of 
projects and products (they 
should not be necessary 
scientific, they should be at least 
of image value)» 
promote the IP we 
already have 
6 «repetition of the experiments 
for IP on hand» 
follow the development 
of demand in the field 
5 «prognosis of field development, 
following trends of novel 
methodologies» 
search for new emerging 
needs 
3 «we can develop something like 
a mix - a product on demand 
with an interesting package» 
have clear and active 
marketing strategy 
16 «to increase the value of IP, one 
needs to develop the clear 
"cover" of the company - site, 
marketing materials, precise 
branding on B2B market» 
inform the scientific 
community of our 
patents 
2 «it is not only important to 
patent something, but to inform 
scientific community about it» 
Total 35  
Offering 
 
have a great product 4 «all of this should be summed 
up, and the great product will be 
developed» 
check other products on 
the market and create 
similar products by 
ourselves 
2 «it is important to know market 
news, see what is proposed in 
packaging, constituents, 
nosology, what people are 
creating» 
develop more services 
and/or product on 
demand 
5 «creation of new direction - 
service is to increase the value of 
intellectual property» 
create new services for 
other companies who 
also want to protect 
2 «one more thing is to develop 
the new direction of activities - 
services for increasing the value 
their IP of IP for Russian companies in 
the scientific fields» 
have many projects 2 «there should be a lot of 
projects» 
Total 15  
Staff 
 
focus on our staff 3 «I can say that the first effort 
that the company should do is 
staff» 
showcase success within 
the company 
2 «catch the employees on their 
successes» 
Total 5  
Sales target specific client 
groups 
5 «institutions, universities and 
scientists» 
Total 5  
Funding secure funding 10 «investments are needed» 
Total 10  
Total  96  
 
All participants during the oral response presented the same information they had 
previously written in their individual questionnaire. They did not refer to other speakers' 
responses while presenting their prototypes. After oral presentations, in the follow-up 
questionnaire, four participants noted that some of the specific steps suggested by the 
others were good for solving the problem. Also, in their follow-up questionnaire, six 
participants stated that their initial solution was correct. Two people included parts of 
others’ solutions in their plans. Two engineers and the marketing person were more 
specialised in their approach and focused on some particular solution, whereas four 
participants with more “generalist” approach (economists, managers) provided more 
general ideas. Generalist approaches were found in both young and old participants, as 
well as in participants who worked in the company for different amounts of time. 
However, the assumption that “generalists” could be less prone to confirmation bias than 
“specialists” was not proved, at least for this study sample.  
During the pre- and post-interview with top-manager, the main focus of his response was 
the personnel. However, he changed his emphasis from “more “generalists” are needed” 
to emphasis on including more creativity into corporate life and that people need to be 
praised for their successes.  
The studied team had rather diverse demographics with the age of participants ranging 
from 28 to 61, highly educated, with different career experience. However, the analysis 
shows that the degree of preference in post-questionnaire a month later after the 
workshop of own verses others solutions is similar among all participants: 
 
 
  
Table 2   Preferences of participants towards specific solutions in post-questionnaire (self-originated 
ideas are highlighted in blue) 
Solutions / Participant's response C1F1 C1F2 C1M1 C1M2 C1M3 C1M4 C1M5 
focus on the uniqueness of our 
biotechnology methods 1 2 1 4 1 2 3 
partner with external 
laboratories to create new IP 2 2 4 2 1 4 3 
form good partnerships 1 1 2 2 2 1 3 
partner with external 
professionals and scientists 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 
secure funding 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 
participate in conferences 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 
build good connections 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 
promote the IP we already have 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
have a great product 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
follow the development of 
demand in the field 1 1 
 
2 2 1 1 
check other products on the 
market and create similar 
products by ourselves 2 5 4 1 2 2 2 
search for new emerging needs 1 1 1 1 4 1 2 
have clear and active marketing 
strategy 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 
protect our IP 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 
target specific client groups 1 1 2 1 1 4 1 
develop more services and/or 
product on demand 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 
create new services for other 
companies who also want to 
protect their IP 2 2 1 5 3 3 2 
have many projects 2 2 2 4 5 3 2 
focus on our staff 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 
inform the scientific community 
of our patents 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
showcase success within the 
company 1 1 
 
2 1 3 1 
 
 When the mean ratings were calculated for self- and other-originated statements, and 
ratio of mean value of self-originated opinions to mean value of other-originated opinion, 
the calculated average rating of own responses by participants was 1.25, and of others' 
responses 1.75. The average ratio of own responses rating to the others’ responses rating 
was 0.70, which means that still the participants found their previously held opinions 
more important than their colleagues’ solution suggestions in the post-questionnaire. A 
Mann-Whitney U-test showed that this difference was statistically significant (U=1196.5, 
p=0.013). However, as six out of seven participants gave the top importance rating to 
more solutions in their post-response list of solutions than they had generated themselves 
in their workshop, they could still be argued to see after the experiment a broader picture 
than before.  
After the results from the post-questionnaire were received, average ratings of the ratings 
groups in total were calculated to find out the most “popular” solutions. Figure 2 shows 
average ratings of the proposed solutions with the participants’ preferences calculated. 
The participants’ preferred solutions were: inform the scientific community of our patents 
(Marketing category), have a great product (Offering category), promote the IP we already 
have (Marketing category), develop more services and/or product on demand (Offering 
category), protect our IP (IP category), build good connections (Partnerships category), 
partner with external professionals and scientists (Partnerships category): 
 
Figure 2      Average rating of solutions among participants 
When the responses of participants were analysed against prevalence of factors 
potentially increasing defense or accuracy motivation to showcase how the confirmation 
bias manifests itself in the experiment, the presence of the following elements was 
showcased as potentially strengthening confirmation bias (defense motivation): 
commitment, reversibility, closed-mindedness, and overconfidence. Another defense 
motivation factor according to Hart et al. (2009) – quality of information available 
(disconfirming rather than confirming information of high quality) – was not found in 
participants’ responses. On the other hand, open-mindedness, the element that 
potentially mitigates confirmation bias (accuracy motivation), was showcased in 
participants’ responses. Other factors potentially mitigating confirmation bias – outcome 
 relevance, utility and quality of information available – were not found in participants’ 
responses. 
 
Discussion  
The literature review showed that there is a potential for emergence of confirmation bias 
in business decision-making, and there are several cases that can be referred to (e.g., 
Jorgensen & Papatheocharous, 2015; Verma, 2016). The literature analysis also suggested 
that design thinking and its practices and tools can help strategic decision makers to deal 
with challenges and mitigate cognitive biases, including confirmation bias. These tools 
encourage team members to withhold from judgment and avoid debates, thus helping to 
create more innovative solutions (Liedtka, 2014). However, limited theoretical and 
empirical research has been done on this topic. 
The empirical study conducted might showcase the selectivity exposure (Cotton, 1985; 
Frey, 1986), prevalence of defense motivation, and emergence of confirmation bias in 
strategic decision-making. The study indicated that applying isolated elements of design 
thinking without an awareness of interdependencies of its mindset and tools did not have 
the expected positive influence on strategic decision-making in such a short intervention. 
Many factors increasing the levels of confirmation bias were present during the workshop 
(presence of top-manager, short timing, stress due to uncertainty about the topic and 
methods used, no prior experience with prototyping and group work, highly skilled 
specialists familiar with only their fields of work).  
The participants perceived the idea of giving follow-up comments on others’ prototypes as 
an opportunity to showcase that their particular initial solution was correct, adding that 
some details from others’ answers were appropriate as well. In the conducted workshop 
noteworthy is the connection between the participants’ typical role in the company and 
the initial preference of challenge solution (pre-response and oral response).  
The most positive outcome is that the top-manager noticed the importance of such group 
sessions and creative techniques and decided to focus more on employees' wellbeing and 
recognition of their successes. Also, according to the results of post-questionnaire, 
participants’ knowledge about the challenge subject has been broadened. To us, it seems 
reflective of the intangible value that design thinking could bring to organisations and 
impact collaborative sensemaking. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we discussed the challenge of identification, classification and mitigation of 
confirmation bias in the sensemaking stage of strategic decision-making. The current 
research served as a contribution towards grounding design-thinking research in the 
cognitive bias framework (Liedtka, 2014) by introducing the conceptual framework of how 
confirmation bias can be identified and targeted in strategic decision-making. That could 
be utilised further in other research design, and by managers in preparation of decision-
making sessions. This could help managers to support holistic integration of design 
thinking in the organisational culture, and clarify design thinking’s utility as a method for 
improving organisational decision-making processes and outcomes. The conducted 
empirical study resulted in increasing awareness of the top-management in the case 
company of the opportunity associated with integrating design-thinking tools in the 
problem-solving sessions. 
The literature analysis and empirical study showed that confirmation bias could be 
identified and classified in strategic decision-making (Das, 1999; Krieger & Fiske, 2006; 
Benoliel, 2015). That being said, the introduction of design-thinking tools did not have the 
expected positive influence on strategic decision-making: the lasting effect was not 
achieved, though the use of the tools was seen to be beneficial, from the received 
responses from top-manager and other participants. Therefore, while we managed to 
investigate how to identify and classify confirmation bias, more research is needed to 
study the potential and ways of its mitigation with the help of design thinking. There is a 
possibility that if design-thinking tools are to be applied for a longer period of time, they 
could positively impact strategic decision-making. 
The limitations of the conducted study include limitations of qualitative method chosen 
(poses some restrictions for analysis), sample size, language barrier for assessment of 
study results, lack of prior research studies on the topic, and self-reported data (one 
researcher designed the study, made observations and analysis). It could be inferred that 
more elaborate studies with extensive data collection, and utilization of in-depth 
qualitative approaches and quantitative approaches, could contribute to the chosen field 
of study. Moreover, it would be beneficial to collect qualitative data on how design 
thinking manifests itself at different stages of strategic decision-making process in 
companies to help utilise design thinking, and what difficulties managers express at 
different decision-making stages. This will help broaden the implications of proposed bias 
mitigation framework, as well as see bigger picture of what difficulties managers 
experience (other biases and cognitive limitations), and where they can use design 
thinking more to impact strategic decisions being made. 
It is suggested that comparative workshops could be done with different purposes: one, 
for instance, without management representative, and one where the purpose of the 
study is explained (Morewedge, Yoon, & Scopelliti, 2015). It could be noteworthy to 
compare results in company already utilising design-thinking methods, and in the 
companies that are unfamiliar with the topic. To add, it would be important to try 
different research designs, like creating several prototypes at once and measuring the 
degree of confirmation bias, giving specific pieces of information about the challenge 
before the workshop to participants that could bias them towards their chosen solution, 
propose awards (Dow et al., 2012). It would be as well important to work with the 
challenges, solutions to which will be implemented certainly, to check the change in 
accuracy and defense motivations among participants and the degree of confirmation 
bias. It could be suggested that further research could be done to check whether still 
some difference between “generalists” and “specialists” thinking exists to assess 
confirmation bias emergence. It is as well noteworthy to tie open-mindedness or closed-
mindedness and presumably other potential accuracy or defense motivation factors to 
confirmation bias mitigation. 
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